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Data brokers have begun to sell consumer information to individual
buyers looking to track the activities of romantic interests, professional
contacts, and other people of interest. The types qf data available for consumer
purchase seem likely to expand over the next few years. This trend invites the
emergence of a new type of privacy harm, "relational control "-the influence
that a person can exert on another in their social or professional networks
using covertly acquired private information.
U.S. privacy laws do not protect consumers from the possibility of
relational control. Moreover, few scholars have proposed reforms broad
enough to address this problem. This Note surveys two frameworks which
provide at least a starting point, and considers several other doctrinal shifts
that might limit consumer vulnerability.
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Introduction
It has become easy to purchase data on those in one's social or
professional networks. For example, $23 can buy a person's contact
information and age, organizational memberships, links to social media
accounts, business interests, and known associates.I While at first glance these
data types may not appear dangerous, consumer privacy law offers remarkably
few restrictions on what data can be sold to consumers. Where profit can be
had, a market is likely to follow, expanding the types of data available and
creating new avenues for privacy abuse.
Imagine that you are about to interview someone who has applied for a
position at your company. The person does not have a perfect background, but
the candidate seems like an excellent fit. During the interview, you find you
share many common interests-from favorite television shows to the websites
you read every morning. She shares your political sensibilities and your
concerns about the future. You recommend her enthusiastically for the position,
and she is hired on your recommendation. What you do not know, however, is
that her personal interests and opinions were entirely feigned. She simply
purchased records of your online activity-the data showing what you read and
your recent purchases.
1. For example, a premium search from eVerify's people search costs $19.95 after a
$2.95 charge for a five-day trial. See, e.g., Report Summary, EVERIFY (last visited May 5, 2017),
http://www.everify.com/selection.php?searchType=name&firstname=Theodore&lastname=Rostow&sta




A New Privacy Harm
Consumers' access to the private online activity of their peers may seem
far-fetched, but it is an increasingly common problem. In India, for example,
consumers can buy a person's purchase history from websites like eBay and
Amazon.2 In China, journalists have reported buying individuals' GPS data,
bank balances, hotel and room information (with screenshots of the room), and
internet activity for roughly 700 yuan, or $101 USD. While there are no
reports of these data types being available for purchase in the United States, the
U.S. economy includes thousands of data brokers-companies "whose primary
business is collecting personal information about consumers from a variety of
sources and aggregating, analyzing, and sharing that information, or
information derived from it"4-that sell personal data to a diverse array of
actors.
In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published a study of the
commercial practices of nine data brokers documenting the breadth of their
data collection. Acxiom, one of the largest data brokers, acknowledges that it
has an average of over 3000 data segments on every U.S. consumer.6
Datalogix, a broker that provides data to businesses on the spending of nearly
every U.S. household, has collected data on more than one trillion dollars in
consumer spending.7 In the aftermath of the FTC report, several journalists
have explored this self-regulated industry,8 finding it expansive and profitable.9
2. See Aritra Sarkhel & Neha Alawadhi, How Your Personal Data Sells Cheaper than
Chewing Gum: How India's Fast-Growing Data Brokerage Industry Is Selling Personal Information
Cheaply to Anyone Who Asks, and Why that's Dangerous, ECONOMICTIMES (Feb. 28, 2017),
http://tech.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/internet/how-your-personal-data-sells-cheaper-than-
chew ing-gum/57380518 [hereinafter India's Brokerage Industry].
3. See Personal Data Is up for Sale in China, N.Y. POST (Jan. 6, 2017, 2:55 PM)
[hereinafter Personal Data], http://nypost.com/2017/01/06/personal-data-is-up-for-sale-in-china; Rao Li
Dong & Li Ling, Southern Reporter 700 Yuan To Buy Colleagues on the Whereabouts, Including the
Opportunity To Open Rooms, Internet Cafes and Other 11 Records, SOUTHERN METROPOLIS D. (Dec.
12, 2016), http://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2016-12/12/content 103959.htm (original in
Mandarin).
4. FTC Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION 3 (May 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-
transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Data Brokers].
5. Data segments are consumer categories derived from a data (such as a consumer's
marital status, vehicle purchases, and attendance at baseball games) and subsequent inferences that are
based on that data. An example of a data segment is the category "Soccer Moms," which "might include
all women between the ages of 21 and 45, with children, who have purchased sporting goods within the
last two years[.]" Id. at 19. The nine brokers the FTC studied sold both actual and derived data to
buyers. Id.
6. Data segments are consumer categories derived from a data (such as a consumer's
marital status, vehicle purchases, and attendance at baseball games) and subsequent inferences that are
based on that data. Examples of data segments include "Soccer Moms," which, for example, might
include all women between the ages of 21 and 45, with children, who have purchased sporting goods
within the last two years." Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 9.
8. See, e.g., Paul Boutin, The Secretive World of Selling Data About You, NEWSWEEK
(May 30, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/secretive-world-selling-data-about-you-464789; Steve
Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, CBS NEWS (Mar. 9, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-data-brokers-selling-your-personal-information; see also FTC Data
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While most brokers generate profits by selling data to commercial entities,
many have begun to generate significant revenue by also selling data to
individual consumers.10 Of the nine firms the FTC studied in 2014, three
offered these services and together generated more than $52 million in annual
revenue. The data products they sold were designed primarily for individual
consumers, who use the "products for such purposes as tracking the activities
of executives and competitors, finding old friends, researching a potential love
interest or neighbor, networking, or locating court records." 1
While a growing number of privacy scholars have written on the data
broker industry,12 this Note is the first to consider the implications of an
unregulated data market that allows individual consumers to purchase
information about others without their knowledge or consent.
A. Considering a New Privacy Harm
Over the past two decades, privacy law and scholarship have been pre-
occupied by a central question: what is the harm in a privacy violation?,3
Courts require plaintiffs to show a concrete, particular harm before they will
recognize a privacy violation.14 This legal requirement has led privacy scholars
Brokers, supra note 4, at 17 (describing self-imposed contractual protections that some brokers
unilaterally adopt).
9. See, e.g., Emily Steel, Financial Worth of Data Comes in at Under a Penny a Piece,
FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2013, 8:11 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3cb056c6-d343-lle2-b3ff-
00144feab7de.html (describing how the "multibillion-dollar data broker industry profits on the trade of
thousands of details about individuals . . . [, which] often are sold for a fraction of a penny apiece.").
10. FTC Data Brokers, supra note 4, at 34.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data,
120 PENN ST. L. REV. 777, 788 (2016); Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations:
Separating "Haves" from "Have-Nots", 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411; David C. Vladeck, Consumer
Protection in an Era of Big Data Analytics, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 493, 498 (2016); Ashley Kuempel,
Comment, The Invisible Middlemen: A Critique and Call for Reform of the Data Broker Industry, 36
Nw. J.INT'LL. & Bus.207 (2016).
13. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1132
(2011). The focus on digital privacy's harm has evolved, at least partially, in response to early critiques
that digital privacy interests were economically inefficient or could not be rooted in viable constitutional
claims. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Right to Privacy: The Construction of a Constitutional Time
Bomb, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 311 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Spokeo v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (vacating and remanding the
9th Circuit for "elid[ing] independent 'concreteness' requirement" in its injury-in-fact analysis); see also
In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, Case No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (dismissing plaintiffs' complaints against Google for compiling personally
identifiable information across different Google services, because plaintiffs failed to meet Article III
standing requirements by showing "(1) [plaintiff] has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision"); see also Calo, supra note 13, at 1132 ("A
privacy harm must be 'cognizable', 'actual,' 'specific,' 'material,' 'fundamental,' or 'special' before a
court will consider awarding compensation.").
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to devote considerable energy to identifying (or dismissing) 5 the harms that a
violation of privacy can cause.16
Scholars have mapped privacy harms that flow from the collection,17
aggregation, use,19 and dissemination20 of digital information.21 These harms
15. See, e.g., STEWART A. BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE AREN'T STOPPING
TOMORROW'S TERRORISM (2010); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999); Richard A. Posner,
Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 251 ("Privacy is the terrorist's best friend
16. For example, Daniel Solove sought to map all privacy harms that can be connected
to digital activity. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2006)
(providing a "comprehensive and concrete" description of harms associated with information collection,
processing, dissemination, and intrusion). Recent scholarship has built on his efforts, especially with
respect to the discriminatory implications of "big data." See e.g., Schmitz, supra note 12; see also
Kuempel, supra note 12, at 207 (underscoring the discriminatory implications of data commoditization).
In a 2015 article surveying the history of privacy regulation in the United States, Maureen Ohlhausen
and Alexander Okuliar conclude that inquiries into the type and scope of harm, along with the
possibility of remedy, remain the best way to determine how legally to respond to a privacy concern. See
Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and The Right
[Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121, 153-55 (2015). Nevertheless, some privacy scholars
consider the harms related to privacy violations to be thoroughly mapped, and some scholars have
looked to move away from a focus on privacy harm. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1125, 1164-65 (2015) (providing examples of scholars moving away from a focus on privacy
harm).
17. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000); Paul M. Shwartz, Privacy and Democracy in
Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1656 (1999); Solove, supra note 16, at 493 ("Not only can direct
awareness of surveillance make a person feel extremely uncomfortable, but it can also cause that person
to alter her behavior ... . lead[ing] to self-censorship and inhibition.").
18. See, e.g., Big Data: A Report on Algorithmic Systems, Opportunity, and Civil
Rights, EXEC. OFFICE PRESIDENT (May 2016),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2016_0504_datadiscrimination.pdf;
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1-10
(2004) (describing the tailored "digital dossiers" that are collected and how this can be harmful in the
context of government access to information); Raymond Daniel Moss, Note, Civil Rights Enforcement
in the Era of Big Data: Algorithmic Discrimination and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 48 COLUM.
HUM. RT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
19. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016); Jonathan Zittrain, Response, Engineering an Election: Digital
Gerrymandering Poses a Threat to Democracy, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 335-36 (2014),
http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/06/engineering-an-election; Bruce Schneier, Why Uber's 'God View'
Is Creepy, CNN (Dec. 4, 2014, 8:03 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/04/opinion/schneier-uber-
privacy-issue; Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever Finding Out,
NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-fiduciary-
solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering.
20. In recent well-publicized instances, both commercial entities and hackers have
used the threat of dissemination to try to extort concessions from individuals. See Balkin, supra note 19,
at 1187-94 (describing Uber's efforts to "dig up dirt" on a critical Buzzfeed reporter); Laurie Segall,
Ashley Madison Users Now Facing Extortion, CNNMONEY (Aug. 21, 2015, 7:00 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/21/technology/ashley-madison-users-extorted.
21. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 16, at 492-94 (providing a "comprehensive and
concrete" description of harms associated with information collection, processing, dissemination, and
intrusion); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework
For Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy (2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM'N, Protecting
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range22 from less tangible-including ill ease or anxiety at the prospect of
being constantly monitored 23 (which can also lead to self-censorship 24),
consumer manipulation by companies,25 and voter manipulation by
campaigns 26-to more tangible harms, such as blackmail27 and stalking.28
Identified harms also manifest in social sorting and discrimination,29 an
30 31increased vulnerability to cyber attacks, and identity theft.
Scholarship that has analyzed the privacy implications of the data broker
industry discuss harms parallel to those that Daniel Solove and others have
previously identified. David Vladeck's analysis of the broker industry
highlights three privacy harms-identity theft (the most urgent), data breaches,
and the unrestrained collection of sensitive, personal data.32 Rebecca Lipman's
work underscores both how data brokers provide capacity for third parties to
deliver targeted advertising, 33 as well as how these datasets can facilitate
harmful social sorting.34 Amy Schmitz argues that data sales can encourage
22. See M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L. J. 1131 (2011)
(describing the boundaries of "objective" harms-involving financial, dignitary, or other tangible loss-
and "subjective" harms-involving psychological ill-ease or distress).
23. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 16, at 493 ("[D]irect awareness of surveillance [can]
make a person feel extremely uncomfortable . . . ."); see also Tatiana Siegel, Sony Hack Fallout:
Executives Now "Afraid" To Send Emails, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/sony-hack-fallout-executives-afraid-758506.
24. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 17, at 1426 ("[P]ervasive monitoring of every first
move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland and the mainstream."); Shwartz,
supra note 17, at 1656 (arguing that the internet's constant surveillance of the "naked thought's digital
expression short-circuits the individual's own process of decisionmaking").
25. See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 12; Andrew Hasty, Note, Treating Consumer
Data Like Oil: How Re-framing Digital Interactions Might Bolster the Federal Trade Commission's
New Privacy Framework, 67 FED. COMM. L.J. 293, 300 (2015).
26. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Candidates Won't Hesitate To Use Manipulative
Advertising To Score Votes, GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2016, 6:45 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/04/presidential-election-voter-data-manipulative-
advertising-privacy.
27. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 19, at 1187-94 (describing Uber's attempt to find
embarrassing information on a reporter to dissuade her from continuing to write negative stories about
the company); Segall, supra note 20.
28. See, e.g., Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003) (describing a
New Hampshire resident's purchase of an acquaintance's personal information from an information
broker in order to stalk and ultimately murder her).
29. See, e.g., Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Open Data, Privacy, and Fair
Information Principles: Towards a Balancing Framework, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2073, 2091-93
(2015) (describing the privacy interest in avoiding social sorting, which involves "obtain[ing] personal
and group data in order to classify people and populations according to varying criteria" and
discrimination); Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735 (2015).
30. Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite
Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 454-59 (2014) (describing how the prominence of
data sale and bulk data brokers exacerbates data vulnerability).
31. Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1229 (2003).
32. Vladeck, supra note 12, at 501-12.
33. Cf. Slade Bond, Doctor Zuckerberg: Or, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and
Love Behavioral Advertising, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129 (20 10).
34. Lipman, supra note 12, at 781-82.
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discrimination and reinforce preexisting power imbalances through the secret
scoring and segmenting of consumers' economic value.35 However, these
important concerns do not contemplate distinct, new harms that may stem from
the sale of digital information.
This Note adds to the scholarship on data sales by arguing that the
creation of a market for individuals to buy data on their peers enables a new
privacy harm: "relational control." Relational control occurs when individuals
acquire the private data of those in their social or professional networks. When
data brokers sell consumer data to individuals, they allow buyers to learn about
the behavior and motivations of those whose data they purchase. These insights
allow the buyers to influence the decisions of those around them, leading to
potential harms unrecognized by privacy scholarship to date.
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I surveys the data broker industry and
the market for data that is sold to individuals. Part II reviews existing U.S.
commercial privacy law and explores how the law fails to protect consumers
from or provide remedies for most relational control harms. Part III elaborates
on the theoretical premises of the relational control harm and outlines why this
threat is likely to grow.
Part IV assesses the interventions that scholars and technologists have
offered to combat commercial privacy threats and explains why these reforms
fail to remedy consumer exposure to relational control. Part V explains why
two recent frameworks-Paul Ohm's "sensitive data" theory and Jack Balkin's
"information fiduciaries" theory-offer possible paths to reduce the likelihood
of relational control, although neither is designed to prevent a relational control
harm.
Finally, Part VI proposes a number of doctrinal shifts in existing privacy
law that may reduce consumer exposure to relational control. Congress and
state legislatures could also move to protect certain types of information as
sensitive and impose heightened diligence and consent standards (or an outright
ban) on transactions involving these types of information. Common law courts
could also expand tort law to allow consumers harmed by relational control to
sue where information was wrongly used or sold. However, none of these
proposals is a panacea, and, further, each could prove economically disruptive.
Though there are a number of ways to reduce consumer exposure, the problem
of relational control is not easily solved.
I. The Data Broker Industry and the Market for Buying People's Data
This Part introduces what is currently known about the data broker
industry and the sale of consumer information to individuals.
35. Schmitz, supra note 12.
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A. An Expansive U.S. Broker Industry
The data broker industry in the United States has expanded considerably
over the past few years. A 2016 Newsweek report estimates that the industry
includes between 2500 and 4000 data brokers. 36 Unlike large companies like
Google and Facebook, data brokers try to avoid name recognition37 while
collecting data on American consumers.38
Brokers collect information from a combination of public records,
publicly available information, and non-public, proprietary sources. 39 Major
public sources of data are federal and state governments, which provide
consumer information relating to recreational and professional licenses;
bankruptcies; driving histories; voter registration; mortgages; and birth,
marriage, divorce, and death records. 40 Data brokers also scrape publicly
available data from social networking sites and blogs, and buy and sell private
data from digital services.41 Of the nine data brokers the FTC surveyed in 2014,
eight bought data from commercial entities, including purchase information
(such as dates of transactions, dollar amounts spent, and types of card used),
and aggregated transactional data from financial services companies.42 At least
one of the nine brokers purchased consumers' web browsing activities from
online advertising networks.43 As many commentators note, there is no legal
regime that prevents brokers and other companies from sharing data with
individuals and companies.44 A wide array of entities-from political
45 .46 47
campaigns to antivirus companies -buy and sell data with brokers.
36. Boutin, supra note 8.
37. Kroft, supra note 8 ("What most of you don't know, or are just beginning to
realize, is that a much greater and more immediate threat to your privacy is coming from thousands of
companies you've probably never heard of, in the name of commerce.").
38. Vladeck, supra note 12, at 498 ("Make no mistake, there is little question that the
major data brokers know more about each of us than, say, for example, the National Security Agency,
the Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration, or any other government institution.").
39. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-663, INFORMATION
RESELLERS CONSUMER PRIVACY FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO REFLECT CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY AND
THE MARKETPLACE 3-4 (2013) [hereinafter GAO Information Resellers].
40. See FTC Data Brokers, supra note 4, at 11-13.
41. See id. at 13-14.
42. See id. at 13-14.
43. See id. at 14.
44. See, e.g., Boutin, supra note 8 ("As shady as it might sound, the entire industry is
completely legal.").
45. See, e.g., Neal Ungerleider, Yes, Political Campaigns Follow Your Browser
History, FASTCOMPANY (Nov. 5, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3021092/yes-political-
campaigns-follow-your-browser-history ("There are few laws preventing marketing firms working on
election campaigns (or, for that matter, selling laundry) . . . .").
46. See, e.g., James Temperton, AVG Can Sell Your Browsing and Search History to
Advertisers, WIRED (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/avg-privacy-policy-browser-search-
data ("While AVG has not utilised data models to date, we may, in the future, provided that it is
anonymous, non-personal data, and we are confident that our users have sufficient information and
control to make an informed choice.").
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B. Data Sales to Individual Consumers
Selling big data is lucrative. The nine brokers surveyed generated a
combined $426 million in annual revenue. In general, this revenue stemmed
from three business lines: marketing, risk mitigation, and "people search." 48
Most relevant to this Note's inquiry is people search, as the services that
comprise people search are "often intended for use by individuals."49 The FTC
noted that "users utilize people search products for such purposes as tracking
the activities of executives and competitors, finding old friends, researching a
potential love interest or neighbor, networking, or locating court records., 0
Three of the nine brokers offered people search products and generated a
combined $52.69 million in annual revenue.51
The number of brokers offering people search services in the United
States remains unknown. In 2014, reporter Julia Angwin documented her
attempts to opt out from over 200 data brokers, including sixty-four that
specialized in people search services.52 In 2015, columnist Cynthia Alice
Andrews compiled a directory of the websites and privacy policies of 257
people search services.53
With few exceptions, little is known about the types of information that
these brokers sell to consumers. Some well-known brokers like Spokeo only
sell information derived from public sources. However, there are hundreds of
brokers that offer people search services in the United States, and it is unlikely
that each refrains from selling non-public information. A 2013 GAO report on
the data broker industry notes, without naming specific companies, that U.S.
brokers offer people search services that incorporate data from "proprietary
sources" in addition to information that consumers make publicly available or
47. See e.g., Lois Beckett, How Microsoft and Yahoo Are Selling Politicians Access to
You, PROPUBLICA (June 11, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-microsoft-and-
yahoo-are-selling-politicians-access-to-you ("[T]he credit reporting giant Experian performs a 'double-
blind' match between Microsoft's data and campaigns' data. Yahoo uses another massive data company,
Acxiom. Both Experian and Acxiom also offer similar matching for commercial clients who want to
find previous customers online."). The use of double-blind or other anonymization features is
particularly susceptible to de-anonymization, even by a "regular" consumer. See infra Part III.
48. See FTC Data Brokers, supra note 4, at 23.
49. Id. at 34.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. Some brokers offer limited versions of their people search products to
consumers for free A spokesperson for the people search broker Whitepages claimed that its free search
service received 55 million unique visitors every month. See Kaveh Waddell, How FamilyTreeNow
Makes Stalking Easy, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2017),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/the-webs-many-search-engines-for-your-
personal-information/513323 ("With that volume of visitors, we do our best to make sure we're only
offering up landline telephone numbers and addresses" to users who don't pay for [its $30 a month
"Premium" service] ... ")
52. See Julie Angwin, Privacy Tools: Opting Out from Data Brokers (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://juliaangwin.com/privacy-tools-opting-out-from-data-brokers.
53. See Cynthia Alice Andrews, Breaking It Down: The Data On Data Brokers, FLIP
MEDIA (Feb. 09, 2015), http://flipthemedia.com/2015/02/breaking-data-data-brokers.
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exists in public records. 54 And, as noted, brokers in other countries have begun
to sell individuals consumer data that originates from, among others,
proprietary sources in the United States like eBay and Amazon.55
II. Gaps in U.S. Commercial Privacy Law
U.S. commercial privacy protections are derived from distinct,
intersecting authorities-including federal and state statutory law, tort law,
agency regulations, promulgated industry best practices, and private contractual
agreements. This Part surveys how these authorities provide few checks on the
sale of consumer data.
A. Statutory Privacy Protections in the Commercial Sphere
The United States has adopted a patchwork, sectoral approach to federal
privacy law in the commercial sphere. 56 The Telecommunications Act bars
ISPs from using, disclosing, or permitting access to "individually identifiable
customer proprietary network information" for purposes outside of the
provision of the telecommunications services from which the information is
derived.57
Beyond ISPs, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) imposes an array of
obligations on consumer reporting agencies and offers protections for personal
credit information. For example, the FCRA grants individuals the right to
request a copy of their credit report, limits the purposes for which a credit
report can be used, and obligates agencies to correct errant information.60
The Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
governs how doctors and medical services must protect the data of their
patients.61 HIPAA mandated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS) promulgate rules for certain health information controlled by providers,
54. See GAO Information Resellers, supra note 39, at 3-4.
55. See sources cited in supra notes 2-3.
56. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL H. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
790-98 (5th ed. 2015) (describing the various privacy laws that regulate distinct sectors of U.S.
industry); Omer Tene, Privacy Law's Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of The Second Wave of
Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1217 (2013).
57. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012). This prohibition exists notwithstanding the recent law that
set aside the FCC's October 2016 rule, which would have prevented ISPs from selling a consumer's data
with out their opt-in permission. See Alex Johnson, Trump Signs Measure To Let ISPs Sell Your Data
Without Consent, NBC News (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-signs-
measure-let-isps-sell-your-data-without-consent-n742316 (referring to S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong.
(2017)).
58. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2012).
60. See, e.g., FCRA Summary of Rights, EQUIFAX (last visited Feb. 18, 2017),
http://www.equifax.com/privacy/fcra.
61. See Health Information Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
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62health care plans, and clearinghouses. The HHS privacy rule aims to
safeguard all "protected health information"-individually identifiable
information, including demographic data, and information relating to a
patient's medical background and care-that these entities hold. The privacy
rule establishes a set of national standards for protecting patient information,
including setting standards for sufficiently de-identified data.63
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GBLA) and the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA) regulate the financial and education services,
respectively. FERPA bars disclosure of students' educational records.6 The
GLBA requires that covered financial services entities give notice of their
privacy practices, secure customer records, and provide a right for consumers
to opt out of data sharing with third parties. s
A particularly important piece of legislation to this Note's inquiry is the
Stored Communications Act (SCA),66 passed by Congress as part of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).67 The SCA prohibits
electronic communications providers from disclosing digital communications
to nongovernmental entities without the consent of the message's originator or
recipient.68
However, the adequacy of existing federal statutory protections should not
be overstated and many scholars have questioned their fundamental efficacy.69
A common critique is that these statutes protect particular channels of data
flow, rather than certain data types or data that may be relevant to certain
recognized private interests.70 For example, Rebecca Lipman describes how
HIPAA does not apply to health data that is generated by FitBits, Google
Searches, Apple Watches, or other devices that comprise the Internet of
Things. Similarly, FERPA does not impose rules on the data that commercial
studying applications collect, which allows companies to make "consequential
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(2) (2012).
63. See HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164.514(b)-(c) (2002); infra Part III.
64. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012).
65. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.); Chris Hoofnagle, Comparative Study on
Different Approaches to New Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological
Developments, B-I The United States of America, EUR. COMMISSION: DIRECTORATE-GENERAL JUST.,
FREEDOM & SECURITY 3 (May 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/studies/files/new-privacy-.challenges/finalreport-country-report-b I usa.pdf.
66. 18 U.S.C.§§ 2701-12 (2012).
67. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012).
69. See, e.g., Tene, supra note 56, at 1217 ("At best, the current framework strains to
keep up with new developments; at worst, it has become irrelevant.").
70. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 16, at 1191.
71. Lipman, supra note 12, at 788; id. at 803 (describing the growing number of
devices and household appliances that are connected to the internet for the purposes of convenient
remote control, energy efficiency, and data tracking).
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inferences" about "a child's intelligence or interests." 72 Paul Ohm notes how
the GLBA only applies to a narrow subset of entities that are defined by the
statute as "financial institution[s]." 73 Congress has also relaxed certain
restrictions that would otherwise protect certain types of digital data. Ohm
notes how the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), passed by Congress after
a reporter publicized Judge Robert Bork's video rental records during his
Supreme Court confirmation hearings, was amended so as not to apply to
online video streaming after Netflix waged a lengthy campaign to relax
protections.74
As a general rule, statutes do not prevent brokers from buying and selling
an enormous amount of information, digitally produced by consumers, relating
to their health and physiology, cognitive abilities, interests, purchases, wealth,
compulsions, and social networks. Two noteworthy exceptions to this trend are
the (flawed75) SCA and (far stronger) Children's Online Privacy Act
76(COPPA). Despite describing an outdated technical reality, courts have
interpreted the SCA to protect certain digital communications that many
applications cannot sell to third parties.77 The SCA, however, does not extend
to social media posting or comments, and its language-passed in 1986 as part
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act-no longer coheres in today's
technological environment. 78 In contrast, COPPA provides robust protection of
the privacy of minors. Ohm notes how COPPA "applies broadly to any
'operators of websites and online services,' without further limitation," 79 and
the FTC has made clear that this definition expands as technology changes to
cover mobile apps, browser plug ins, and third-party networks. These narrow
exceptions notwithstanding, Congress has passed no statute that imposes
checks on, or regulation of, data broker activity.
State legislation similarly provides few checks on broker activity.
California has moved to expand privacy protections more than any other state,
but its regulations generally do not reach data brokers. California has passed
legislation that (1) expands the SCA to prohibit employers from looking at the
72. Id.
73. Ohm, supra note 16, at 1190 n.362.
74. Id. at 1140.
75. See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004); see also Matter of Warrant To
Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, 829 F.3d 197
(2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring) (pointing to Kerr's critiques from more than twelve years prior as
evidence of pressing need for Congress to revisit the statute).
76. See Child Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681-728, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06.
77. See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (2010).
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012) (distinguishing entities that provide "electronic
communications services" (ECS) and "remote communications services" (RCS)); Kerr, supra note 75;
infra Part VI.
79. Ohm, supra note 16, at 1192 (quoting COPPA).
80. 16 C.F.R. pt. 312.
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private social networks of employees and prospective employees (which does
not apply to data brokers), (2) requires businesses that collect personally
identifiable information to prominently display their privacy policy (which
applies to data brokers)82 and (3) requires companies to disclose what
information they share with other companies for marketing purposes (which
does not).83 Additionally, scholars note that, outside of California, other state
legislatures thus far avoided imposing new regulations on the data broker
industry. 84
B. Judicial Limitations on Privacy Protection
Absent statutes, courts provide little protection from possible abuses that
may arise from the commoditization of data. For the past fifty years, courts
have recognized four privacy torts: intrusion, public disclosure of private facts,
false light, and appropriation. Of the four, relational control most directly
implicates the intrusion tort, as a purchaser attempts to gain access to private
information by purchasing another's data. The Second Restatement of Torts
defines the intrusion tort as: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." 86
In addition to showing that a data transaction constitutes an intrusion upon
one's seclusion (or satisfies a statutory hook, like the FCRA), a plaintiff must
also demonstrate that the harm satisfies Article III standing requirements. To
show standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an injury-in-fact that is concrete
81. California Social Media Privacy Act of 2012, CAL.LAB.CODE § 980 (West 2012).
82. CAL. CIV.CODE § 1798.83(b) (2006).
83. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83(a)(1), (e)(6)(A) (2006); see Lipman, supra note 12, at
794.
84. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys
General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 810 (2016) (highlighting the efforts of former FTC
Commissioner Julie Brill to press state attorneys general to investigate data brokers under state Unfair
and Deceptive Acts and Practices statutes). Historically, state legislation has focused on data security
rather than privacy. See, e.g., The Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of
Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255 (2005) (describing a number of state data security laws and
highlighting California's oft-discussed and widely praised Security Breach Information Act); Ohm,
supra note 16, at 1127 n.3. However, this trend may be shifting, as state legislatures, attorneys general,
and privacy advocates look to use state power to protect consumer privacy. See, e.g., Erin Golden,
Minnesota Legislature Pushes Back on Internet Privacy, STAR TRIBUNE (Mar. 30, 2017),
http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-legislature-pushes-back-on-internet-privacy/417670943; Press
Release, Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, AG Reaches Settlement with Advertising
Company Prohibiting 'Geofencing' Around Massachusetts Healthcare Facilities (Apr. 4, 2017),
http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2017/2017-04-04-copley-advertising-
geofencing.html.
85. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (emphasis
added).
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and particularized,87 (2) "fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision."88
These twin standing and tort requirements have led courts to reject most
privacy claims that challenge the sale of information.
In Shibley v. Time, Inc., an Ohio court dismissed a plaintiffs suit against
magazine publishers that sold subscription requests to direct mail advertisers.
The court held that although the purchasers of the lists could learn about the
plaintiffs lifestyle, the sale of lists would not "cause mental suffering, shame
or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities." 90 Similarly, in Dwyer v.
American Express Co., an Illinois appellate court rejected a plaintiffs privacy
suit that objected to American Express's sale of consumer profiles that were
derived from their spending habits.9 ' The Dwyer court similarly held that
American Express's sale of consumer profiles did not meet the standards for
one of the four types of privacy tort.
On one occasion a New Hampshire court, faced with a particularly grisly
murder, left the door ajar that a data broker might be liable for negligence,
where criminal activity could have been predicted. In Remsburg v. Docusearch,
Inc., 92 a New Hampshire resident purchased an acquaintance's personal
information from an information broker in order to stalk and ultimately murder
her. Due to the particular targeted nature of the New Hampshire resident's
inquiries, 93 the court found that an early data broker might be liable for
negligence if the buyer's manifested activity suggested foreseeable criminal
misconduct against the target of his data acquisition. However, the court noted
that the possibility of this narrow exception runs against the general
presumption that "a private citizen has no general duty to protect others from
the criminal attacks of third parties." 94 As a general rule, courts have not
restricted the sale of data under either tort or statutory law.
C. Agency Regulation ofData Transactions
In contrast to the statutory and judicial remedies, federal agencies have
proved more responsive to digital privacy concerns. Of recent significance is
the (now repealed) 95 2016 action by the Federal Communications Commission
87. See sources cited in supra note 14 and accompanying text (vacating the 9th Circuit
ruling and remanding because the claim failed to satisfy standing requirements).
88. Spokeo v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
89. Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio App. 1975).
90. Id. at 339.
91. Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. 1995).
92. 816 A.2d 1001 (2003).
93. The resident sought at different times the date of birth, social security number, and
home address, for one person, and the resident paid over $200 for the information. See id. at 1006-07.
94. Id. at 1006-07; cf. SEINFELD, The Finale (television broadcast May 14, 1998)
("You don't have to help anybody! That's what this country's all about!").
95. See supra note 57.
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(FCC) to require ISPs to disclose the types of information they collect and gain
consumer consent to sell their data.96 Had it gone into effect, the privacy rule
would have required ISPs to disclose the types of information that they collect,
the purposes for which the data are used, and what information they share.97
Beyond the purview of ISP regulation," the FTC has been the leading
advocate for consumer privacy, issuing over 170 privacy complaints against
companies for privacy violations.99 The FTC derives its authority from Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices."100 Under this authority, the FTC targets an array of commercial
privacy practices. For example, the FTC entered into a consent decree with
Snapchat after the agency learned that the company stored messages on its
servers, despite its claims that those messages would disappear.1 0 1 As part of
the consent decree, Snapchat agreed to submit to twenty years of monitoring to
ensure it did not deceive customers.102 The FTC has entered into similar
consent decrees with Facebook, when in its early days the company did not
adhere to its own privacy policies,103 as well as other apps whose privacy
policies are deceptive (as opposed to merely vague and lawyerly, as is the
norm).1 04
The FTC has also, on occasion, moved against data brokers. In 2006, a
data broker was ordered to pay civil penalties after the FTC alleged that it
96. Brian Fung & Craig Timberg, The FCC Just Passed Sweeping New Rules To
Protect Your Online Privacy, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2016/10/27/the-fcc-just-passed-sweeping-new-rules-to-protect-your-online-privacy/ ("But the
FCC may have little jurisdiction-or appetite-for regulating the data practices of individual Web
companies; Wheeler has repeatedly declined to extend new regulations to the sector.").
97. Id.
98. Cf. Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, In the Matter of
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 5609-10 (2015) ("The open Internet
rules ... apply to both fixed and mobile broadband Internet access service . .. . '[B]roadband Internet
access service' (BIAS) . . . is defined to be: A mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides
the capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints,
including any capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the communications service,
but excluding dial-up Internet access service. This term also encompasses any service that the
Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the service described in the previous
sentence, or that is used to evade the protections set forth in this Part." (emphasis removed)).
99. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600,610 (2014).
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52 (2012); see Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission
and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 809, 811 (2011) (tracing the FTC's evolving role in the enforcement of consumer protection).
101. Electronic Privacy Information Center, In re: Snapchat (last visited Apr. 1,
2017), http://epic.org/privacy/intemet/ftc/snapchat/#response.
102. Brett Molina, Snapchat Settles Privacy Complaint with FTC, USA TODAY (May
8, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/05/08/snapchat-ftc/8853239.
103. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It
Deceived Consumers by Failing To Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/20 11/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep.
104. See FTC Data Brokers, supra note 4, at 42.
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violated the FCRA by furnishing credit reports to subscribers.105 More recently,
in 2015, the FTC charged data broker Sequoia One with "knowingly selling the
financial information of applicants for payday loans to a scam operation that
took millions of dollars from consumers by debiting their bank accounts or
charging their credit cards without their consent." 06
However, these actions reflect the outer bound of the FTC's authority to
check the activity of data brokers. The FTC may only pursue action against (1)
commercial activity that violates existing law, or (2) activity that involves the
broker knowingly facilitating crimes.10 7 The recent FTC broker report
highlights the agency's limited jurisdictional reach-the FTC can "only call for
transparency and accountability, they cannot mandate it without supporting
legislation." In the case of the sale of consumer data to other consumers, the
FTC would not have the authority or justification to allege unfair business
practices or any other statutory violation
D. Contractual Restrictions on the Sale ofDigital Information
One legal obstacle to the selling of information to individuals stems from
certain contractual agreements that individual companies may require when
they sell data to brokers. The FTC report noted that companies that sell data to
brokers "may also prohibit data brokers from re-using or re-selling data without
permission; decoding or reverse engineering the data;" or require "a written
agreement affirming that the data broker will only use the data for a specified
purpose."'o9 However, state and federal statutes do not require these
protections, which buyers or sellers self-impose on an individual basis. 10
III. The Threat of Relational Control
This Part introduces the concept of relational control and explains both (i)
how the sale of personal information to individuals can be harmful and (ii) why
the sale of consumers' data will likely expand in the coming years.
105. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction,
and Other Equitable Relief, United States v. Choicepoint Inc., No. 1:06-cv-00198-JTC (N.D. Ga. Feb.
15, 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/01/stipfinaljudgement.pdf.
106. CQ Roll Call Staff, FTC Cites 2015 Successes in Privacy, Data Security Actions,
2016 WL 2759289 (Apr. 6,2016).
107. Cf. Lipman, supra note 12, at 790 ("If users do not do their homework on what
information their apps are collecting about them, and the app makers are not foolish enough to outright
lie about what they are doing, the FTC's ability to control how companies share our data is very
limited.").
108. Id. at 789 (emphasis removed).
109. See FTC Data Brokers, supra note 4, at 17. For more on how these contractual
provisions could be useful hooks to prevent relational control, see infra Part V.
110. Emily Steel, Disparate Network of Companies Is Difficult To Bring to Heel, FIN.
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There may be legitimate reasons why a person would want to buy records
of another's digital activity, whether to use as a screening mechanism or to
increase transparency. However, these possible benefits are not central to this
Note's inquiry. This Note highlights a particular problem-relational control-
that may accompany the sale of consumer data to individual buyers.
The premise of relational control proceeds from two assumptions. First,
certain informational advantages have powerful effects among members of the
same social or professional network. Second, these types of information either
areil] or will soon be available for legal purchase.
A. Informational Asymmetries as Tools for Social Influence
Information drives human society. The need for information is why
intelligence gathering is an essential tool of statecraft.112 Even outside of the
national security realm, however, all human actions are influenced by a wide
array of factors and variables, many of which are indiscernible to both the
decision maker and observer.11 3 Nevertheless, the more an individual can
access relevant data, the more easily that individual can predict the actions of
another person or group.
Not all information is useful. A link to a person's Facebook page or public
Twitter profile may not provide hidden behavioral insights or the opportunity to
influence. 114 However, information that reveals a person's private activity can
help explain that person's interests and observable behaviors. In the current
digital climate, myriad data types can provide insights about these private
dynamics.
In the aggregate, social network data can reveal the "underlying social
processes that drive network dynamics, such as the tendency for reciprocity,
transitivity, or the need for group balance.""'5 A specific person's social
111. There are no confirmed reports in the United States of brokers selling user
purchase history, browsing data, or other sensitive information to individual consumers.
112. See, e.g., SUN TzU, THE ART OF WAR (Lionel Giles, trans., 1910),
http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html ("Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself,
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every
victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
succumb in every battle.").
113. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. GALOTTI, MAKING DECISIONS THAT MATTER: How
PEOPLE FACE IMPORTANT LIFE CHOICES 67 (2005) ("People do not have direct introspective access to
many of their higher order cognitive processes. That is, they don't always know why they feel or think
the way that they do.") (internal reference omitted); Cindy Dietrich, Decision Making: Factors that
Influence Decision Making, Heuristics Used, and Decision Outcomes, 2 INQUIRIES J. 1-2 (2010)
(surveying psychological research on human decision making).
114. But see Ashley Feinberg, This Is Almost Certainly James Comey's Twitter
Account, GIZMODO (Mar. 30, 2017), http://gizmodo.com/this-is-almost-certainly-james-comey-s-twitter-
account-1793843641.
115. Arun Sundararajan et al., Research Commentary, Information in Digital,
Economic, and Social Networks, 24 INFO. SYS. RES. 883,895 (2013).
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network data can similarly map that person's interactions 16-conversations,
rivalries, romantic interests, and bitter pasts.1 17 An individual's browsing data
can reveal what causes that person to feel joyful or stressed, as well as what
that person reads, watches, plays, or listens to for information, levity, and
distraction. These data capture compulsions, neuroses, and lusts,118 and help
reveal personality flaws and strengths.119 Biometric data provide even more
granularity: wearable technology can capture sleep cycles, the frequency of
sexual activity, exercise patterns, and heart rate responses over time-a record
of how people's bodies respond to the joys, frustrations, curiosities, and
minutiae of day-to-day life.1 20
While the effects of covert access to these data types has not yet been
studied, scholars have explored how someone with a favorable access to
information are advantaged in a variety of contexts. Researchers studied email
traffic in a recruiting firm, finding that "access to information strongly predicts
the number of projects completed by each individual and the amount of revenue
that person generates."l21 Information access can also provide means to
develop productive relationships. In experiments that simulated
communications between negotiators, researchers found that bargainers used
"informational and relational messages to establish a positive social tenor in the
interaction," which facilitated more efficient negotiations.122 Scholarship has
also explored how informational asymmetries provide advantages that can
undermine efficiency in markets123 and influence both peer relationshipsl24 and
broader social networks.1 25
116. See, e.g., Jure Leskovec, Social Circles: Facebook (last visited Feb. 18, 2017),
http://snap.stanford.edu/data/egonets-Facebook.html.
117. Gregory Ferenstein, Predicting Love and Breakups with Facebook Data,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 14, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/14/facebook-love-datal.
118. See, e.g., Wolfie Christl & Sarah Spiekermann, Networks of Control: A Report
on Corporate Surveillance, Digital Tracking, Big Data & Privacy 12-17 (2016),
http://www.privacylab.at/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Christl-Networks-K-o.pdf.
119. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(arguing that access to GPS data enabled the state to learn of any citizen's "trips to the psychiatrist, the
plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense
attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and
on and on" (internal citations omitted)).
120. See, e.g., Sarah Kellogg, Every Breath You Take: Data Privacy and Your
Wearable Fitness Device, 72 J. Mo. B. 76 (2016).
121. Sinan Aral et al., Productivity Effects of Information Diffusion in Networks 1
(MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper No. 4683-08, 2007),
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/65404/SSRN-idl085354.pdf.
122. Joydeep Srivastava & Dipankar Charkravarti, Channel Negotiations with
Information Asymmetries: Contingent Influence of Communication and Trustworthiness Reputations, 46
J. MARKETING RES. 557 (2009).
123. See, e.g., Antonio Cabrales et al., Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, and
Efficiency: an Experiment, 14 EXP. EcON. 133, 134 (2011) (describing how "the theory of markets with
asymmetric information has been a 'vital and lively field of economic research,"' which has observed
"that asymmetric information led to economic inefficiency, and could even destroy an efficient market"
(internal references omitted)); id. at 134-37 (reviewing existing scholarship on informational
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This Note's opening hypothetical illustrates how asymmetric access to
information about another's habits can change the trajectory of conversations,
affect what people think and feel, and influence a target's decisions about
whom to hire. This is not the only possible example-an informational edge
can give an individual the capacity to nudge, manipulate, and ultimately exert
control over another person's or group's major decisions.126
B. Factors that Suggest Private Consumer Information Will Be Available for
Individual Purchase
Relational control is premised on the availability of one's private,
information being available for purchase by individual consumers.127 This
information is already being sold.128 As previously discussed, brokers in other
countries have begun selling consumer data that was not already publicly
available.129 Little prevents U.S. brokers from soon doing the same.'30
In addition, several other factors suggest that the types of information sold
in the incipient people search market will increase over the next few years,
further exposing consumers to a relational control threat. These factors should
raise significant concerns for privacy scholars, lawmakers, and consumers.
asymmetries in business relationships); James E. Parco, Price-Setting Power and Information
Asymmetry in Sealed Bidding, 27 MANAGE. DECIS. ECON. 413 (2006).
124. See, e.g., Cyril Tomkins, Interdependencies, Trust and Information in
Relationships, Alliances and Networks, 26 ACCT., ORGS. & SoC'Y 161, 166 n.10, 166-67 (2001)
(describing the relationship between information access and trust development in social networks, and
the challenges posed by information asymmetries); Nermin Eyuboglu & Osman A. Atac, Informational
Power: A Means for Increased Control in Channels of Distribution, PSYCHOL. & MARKETING (1991)
125. See, e.g., Nicoleta Bilu & Sonja Utz, Exposing Information Sharing as Strategic
Behavior: Power as Responsibility and "Trust" Buttons, 46 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 593 (2016);
Jeong Hwang et al., Information Asymmetry, Social Networking Site Wordof Mouth, and Mobility
Effects on Social Commerce in Korea, 17 CYBERPSYCHOL., BEHAV. & SOCIAL NETWORKING 117
(2014).
126. Cf. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009) (arguing on a macro level that experts can offer
certain choice architectures that drastically affect consumer decision making).
127. While not the focus of this Note, the possibility of individuals using their
professional roles to secure data on others in their network should not be overlooked, as employees at
both Facebook and the NSA have, in the past, used their access to view the data of others not outside of
professional interest. See Bruce Schneier, Why Uber's 'God View' Is Creepy, CNN (Dec. 4, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/04/opinion/schneier-uber-privacy-issue/index.html ("In the early years of
Facebook, employees had a master password that enabled them to view anything they wanted in any
account. NSA employees occasionally snoop on their friends and partners. The agency even has a name
for it: LOVEINT.").
128. See GAO Information Resellers, supra note 39, at 3-4 (describing public and
proprietary data flows for people search services in the United States).
129. See supra notes 2-3.
130. See generally supra Part II.
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1. The Expansion of Data (and Data Holders)
With each digital advancement over the past 30 years-from internet
accessible personal computers, to smartphones,'31 to wearable technologies,
and now automated personal assistants 32-both the type and amount of data
that consumers produce has increased dramatically. A similar expansion has
occurred with respect to the number of entities-including ISPs, websites,
domains, applications, internet-connected devices, and brokers-that control 33
and sell 34 this data. These trends suggest that consumers may soon be able to
purchase many new types of personal data.
2. Information Is Cheap
While data brokers make hundreds of millions of dollars in annual
revenues, buying personal data in bulk is astonishingly inexpensive.135 Basic
information about a person's age, gender, and location is worth a mere $0.0005
per person.136 More targeted commercial information-such as persons looking
to purchase a car or a vacation-is only marginally more expensive at $0.0021
per person.' 37 Marketers will pay $0.11 to know that a woman is pregnant and
in her second trimester.138 While the cost of data increases with the intimacy of
the information, the prices per person remain low-$0.26 per person will buy
access to lists of people with specific health conditions or taking certain
131. See GAO Information Resellers, supra note 39, at 22.
132. See, e.g., Ingrid Lunden, Google Assistant, its Al-based Personal Helper, Rolls
out to Nougat and Marshmallow Handsets, TEcHCRUNCH (Feb. 26, 2017),
http://techcrunch.com/2017/02/26/google-assistant-its-ai-based-personal-helper-rolls-out-to-nougat-and-
marshmallow-handsets (describing the company's "answer to Apple's Siri and Amazon's Alexa").
133. The proliferation of data controllers is modeled compellingly by theDataMap, a
research project in Harvard University's Data Privacy Lab. See, e.g., Survey of Popular Free Apps,
THEDATAMAP (accessed Apr. 18, 2017), http://thedatamap.org/mobile2014/apps.php.
134. See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Firms Are Buying, Sharing Your Online Info. What Can
You Do About It?, NPR (July 11, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/07/l1/485571291/firms-are-buying-sharing-your-
online-info-what-can-you-do-about-it (describing the observations of former FTC Commissioner Julie
Brill, who noted that companies the vast amount of information that companies shared with each other,
including "what Web pages we visit, where we're shopping, who we're interfacing with on social
media-all of that information is available to be collected by entities that park themselves on the various
websites"); Meta S. Brown, When and Where To Buy Consumer Data (And 12 Companies Who Sell It),
FORBES (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/metabrown/2015/09/30/when-and-where-to-buy-
consumer-data-and-12-companies-who-sell-it/#6dl9b0e73285; GAO Information Resellers, supra note
39, at 22-27.
135. See, e.g., Emily Steel, Companies Scramble for Consumer Data, FIN. TIMES
(June 12, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f0b6edcO-d342-1e2-b3ff-00144feab7de.html; Emily Steel,
Disparate Network of Companies Is Difficult To Bring to Heel, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a0cb7b5e-d343- 1e2-b3ff-00 144feab7de.html.
136. Emily Steel, Financial Worth of Data Comes in at Under a Penny a Piece, FIN.
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prescriptions. 139 Data marketed to individuals is significantly more expensive
than bulk data purchases. 140 And while the price will likely vary depending on
whether the records are available publicly or purchased from proprietary
sources, thus far consumer records of either type have not been prohibitively
expensive for interested buyers. 141
3. Regulators Face Economic and Legal Roadblocks
As noted in Part II, there are few legal obstacles to the purchase and sale
of most online activity.142 The United States' sector-by-sector approach to
privacy regulation leaves few general rules governing what people may do with
data. 143
This legal context seems unlikely to change soon. Not only is a dramatic
shift of U.S. federal statutory law unlikely, but data sale is an enormous, multi-
billion-dollar industry that also provides many positive benefits-including the
many free services that are offered online. Any significant change to U.S.
privacy law would implicate nearly every commercial industry and constitute a
significant departure from longstanding U.S. privacy law. Further,
constitutional roadblocks may stymie possible interventions. Many First
Amendment scholars assert that data sale likely constitutes protected speech,
139. Id. The Financial Times released a pricing calculator for a wide array of
information about one's demographics, property, family and health information, property, activities, and
consumption habits. Selecting all possible price tags yields roughly a rate of $4.8449 per person. See
Emily Steel et al., How Much Is Your Personal Data Worth?, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2013, 8:11 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/927ca86e-d29b- l le2-88ed-00 144feab7de.html.
140. For example, Everify.com charges users $19.95 for a premium search, in addition
to a 19.95 monthly flat-usage rate. See supra note 1. Spokeo charges $4.95 per month for a (quota-
limited) search of information that is collected from publicly available sources. See SPOKEO,
http://www.spokeo.com/purchase?pid=32704751121 &q=Theodore+Rostow&type=name&url=%2FThe
odore-Rostow%2FTexas%2FSan-Antonio%2Fp32704751121.
141. See Personal Data, supra note 3 ("[Tihe private information of many citizens
can be freely purchased by strangers for just 700 yuan, or $101 USD."); Sarkhel & Alawadhi, supra note
2 ("For anywhere between Rs 10,000-15,000 [roughly $150-230 USD], we were offered personal data
of upto 1 lakh [100,000] people in Bangalore, Hyderabad and Delhi.").
142. See, e.g., Neal Ungerleider, Yes Political Campaigns Follow Your Browser
History, FASTCOMPANY (Nov. 5,2013,9:30 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3021092/yes-political-
campaigns-follow-your-browser-history ("There are few laws preventing marketing firms working on
election campaigns (or, for that matter, selling laundry) from leveraging publicly available census and
voter registration data and correlating it with things like, say, purchased supermarket loyalty card
analytics.").
143. See, e.g., GAO Information Resellers, supra note 39, at 22; Data Brokers and
"People Search" Sites, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 16, 2016),
http://www.privacyrights.org/contentL/data-brokers-and-your-privacy ("[T]here are no current federal
laws requiring data brokers to maintain the privacy of consumer data unless they use that data for credit,
employment, insurance, housing, or other similar purposes.. . . No federal law provides consumers with
the right to correct inaccuracies in the data or assumptions made by data brokers." (internal reference
omitted)).
144. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 106 (2014) ("A
corporation that generates and subsequently uses or sells data, even if the revenue stream is ancillary to
its primary product or service, has a cognizable argument that it is in the business of communications,
and is therefore analogous to a traditional press corporation."); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
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which could prevent legislation that aimed to stop brokers from selling data to
consumers. While this Note proposes a number of regulatory, tort, statutory,
and private law reforms that would help mitigate the threat of relational control,
these are by no means simple or cure-all fixes.
4. Anonymization Is Not a Sufficient Solution
Finally, relational control will likely become a more significant problem
due to the well-documented problems associated with data anonymization.
Commercial entities and regulators often respond to consumer privacy concerns
by attempting to remove all identifying features from a data set.145 These
efforts are pervasive in data transactions. For example, the HIPAA Privacy
Rule requires that health data be anonymized,146 and it creates a safe harbor for
companies that (i) remove from datasets eighteen types of identifiers
(including, for example, names, addresses, IP addresses, and social security
numbers) and (ii) also have "[n]o actual knowledge [that] residual information
can identify individual [s]."l47 Similarly, a vast number of companies, including
banks,148 credit cards companies,149 anti-virus software, so telecommunications
companies, ISPs,152 internet companies,153 and data brokers themselves sell
Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right To Stop People from Speaking About You,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2000) (arguing that many privacy laws regulating the sale and disclosure
of personal information are unconstitutional under existing First Amendment law).
145. See, e.g., FTC Data Brokers, supra note 4, at 14.
146. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 164.514(b)-(c) (2002).
147. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, GUIDANCE REGARDING METHODS FOR DE-
IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEALTH INSURANCE
PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) PRIVACY RULE 7-8, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. (2002), http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-
identification/#standard.
148. See, e.g., Jonathan Camhi, Barclays Plans To Sell Anonymized Data to Other
Companies, BANKTECH (June 24, 2013, 11:32 AM), http://www.banktech.com/data-and-
analytics/barclays-plans-to-sell-anonymized-data-to-other-companies/d/d-id/1296436 (announcing
Barclay's plans to sell aggregated checking and savings account data to other private companies and
government agencies).
149. See, e.g., Bernard Marr, American Express Charges into the World of Big Data,
DATAINFORMED (Jan. 13, 2016, 5:30 AM), http://data-informed.com/american-express-charges-into-
world-big-data (describing new American Express business lines using customer data to recommend
third-party products to customers).
150. See, e.g., James Temperton, AVG Can Sell Your Browsing and Search History to
Advertisers, WIRED (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/avg-privacy-policy-browser-search-
data (detailing AVG's updated policy to sell anonymized search and browser history).
151. See, e.g., Bryan Clark, Comcast: ISPs Should Be Able To Sell Your Web History
to Advertisers, TNW (Aug. 3, 2016, 1:09 PM), http://thenextweb.com/insider/2016/08/03/comcast-isps-
should-be-able-to-sell-your-web-history-to-advertisers (reporting that AT&T had been selling customer
data for over a year); Michael H., AT&T Planning To Sell Your Anonymous Usage Data to Advertisers,
PHONEARENA (July 3, 2013, 9:37 PM), http://www.phonearena.com/news/AT-T-planning-to-sell-your-
anonymous-usage-data-to-advertisers-id44890 (announcing AT&T plans to sell anonymized customer
data).
152. Swati Khandelwal, ISPs Sell Your Data to Advertisers, But FCC Has a Plan To
Protect Privacy, HACKER NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016), http://thehackemews.com/2016/03/isp-sells-data-to-
advertisers.html; supra note 57.
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data to other companies after stripping out personally identifiable information
(PII). 154
However, anonymization cannot guarantee that a person is not tied to their
data, according to many computer scientists, data analysts, and privacy
scholars. 55 Surveys of common anonymization and de-anonymization methods
reveal the ease with which computers and humans can re-identify anonymized
datasets. For data releases that are explicit (intentional, such as when
anonymized and sanitized datasets are sold) or implicit (unintentional, such as
when partially or fully anonymized datasets are leaked),156 a number of de-
anonymization attacks can re-identify the datasets with ease.
A particularly effective attack (and relevant to our inquiry) involves the
attacker leveraging auxiliary information or background knowledge to identify
the matching dataset. 57 For example, Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov
took user ratings from the IMDB database and used them to expose user IDs
from among 500,000 Netflix users.1s Working off the hypothesis that among
"Netflix subscribers who also use IMDB, there is a strong correlation between
their private Netflix ratings and their public IMDB rating," Narayanan and
Shmatikov discovered that "even a handful of movies that are rated by a
subscriber in both services would be sufficient to identify his or her record in
the Netflix Prize dataset (if present among the released records) with enough
statistical confidence to rule out the possibility of a false match except for a
negligible probability." 59 In addition, Sarah Jamie Lewis has surveyed how a
20GB dataset, comprising more than 173 million individual New York City
153. See e.g., Lois Beckett, How Microsoft and Yahoo Are Selling Politicians Access
to You, PROPUBLICA (June 11, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-microsoft-and-
yahoo-are-selling-politicians-access-to-you (describing the types of information sold by internet
companies to political campaigns).
154. See id. ("[Tlhe credit reporting giant Experian performs a 'double-blind' match
between Microsoft's data and campaigns' data. Yahoo uses another massive data company, Acxiom.
Both Experian and Acxiom also offer similar matching for commercial clients who want to find
previous customers online.").
155. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) ("Although it is true that a malicious
adversary can use PII such as a name or social security number to link data to identity, as it turns out, the
adversary can do the same thing using information that nobody would classify as personally
identifiable."); Scott Berinato, There's No Such Thing as Anonymous Data, HARV. Bus. REV. (Feb. 9,
2015), http://hbr.org/2015/02/theres-no-such-thing-as-anonymous-data ("Broadly, it means that
anonymity doesn't ensure privacy, which could render toothless many of the world's laws and
regulations around consumer privacy.").
156. See Bin Zhou et al., A Brief Survey on Anonymization Techniques for Privacy
Preserving Publishing of Social Network Data, 10 ACM SIGKDD EXPLORATIONS NEWSL. 12 (2008),
http://www.cs.sfu.ca/-jpei/publications/SocialNetworkAnonymization-survey.pdf.
157. Xuan Ding et al., A Brief Survey on De-anonymization Attacks in Online Social
Networks, 2010 INT'L CONF. ON COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS OF Soc. NETWORKS 611, 614.
158. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large
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taxi trips with anonymous licenses, medallion numbers, and other metadata
could easily be subsequently re-identified along with the driver's identity.160
Further, existing relationships pose additional challenges for effective
anonymization. Felix Wu describes the possibility of privacy invasions by
"insiders" in the context of data releases. 161 Wu defines "privacy 'insiders' [as]
those [whose] relationship to a particular individual allows them to know
significantly more about that individual than the general public does."162 Wu
notes that privacy insiders can be particularly difficult to counter, because
insiders "can exploit special knowledge gained through their relationships with
a target individual to deduce more about that individual from released data than
the general public would."1 63 Similarly, Swaroop Poudel observes how, in the
context of anonymized device data,164 knowledge of a person's particular
attributes can lead to identifying an individual without access to their PII.165
While privacy insiders may interact with each other in the physical world with
varying degrees of closeness and trust, their existing knowledge of a person can
pair with acquired data to produce greater insight.
These four factors suggest that the threat of relational control will
continue to grow. Consumers produce increasingly revealing data, which
brokers will continue to sell at a low price. Economic and legal obstacles may
frustrate attempts to regulate data sales, and anonymization cannot adequately
protect consumers. In the absence of any meaningful check, certain individuals
will purchase cheap, powerful data to gain an informational advantage over
their peers.
IV. Existing Proposals Fail To Remedy Relational Control
This Part examines the prominent reforms that privacy scholars have
proposed to address privacy harms that stem from the sale of digital
information.
160. Sarah Jamie Lewis, Please Stop Releasing "Anonymized" Datasets, LINKEDIN
PULSE (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.linkedin.com/pulse/please-stop-releasing-anonymized-datasets-sarah-
jamie-lewis.
161. See Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV.
1117, 1154 (2013). While Wu underscores the unclear legal state of insider attacks, and their difficulty to
counter, neither Wu nor any other scholar has discussed the possibility or implications of these
relationships in the context of peer data purchases.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See also infra Section III.B (discussing the relationship between de-
anonymization and a relational control threat).
165. Swaroop Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying Technologies, Interoperability,
and Threats to Privacy and Security, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 997, 1014 (2016) ("Comprising granular
data with many variables, sensor data can enable someone with knowledge of certain attributes of a
person to identify them, even without their personally identifiable information (P11) . . . . For example,
Fitbit's movement data can reveal someone's gait. Someone who knows a person's gait could, thus,
identify that person and gain access to the rest of his or her Fitbit data." (internal references omitted)).
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A. Broker Industry Reforms
When the FTC released its 2014 Report, the agency proposed a series of
legislative reforms that, if enacted, would offer new privacy protections for
consumers. The FTC signaled its support for the Data Broker Accountability
and Transparency Act (DATA), introduced by Senators Rockefeller and
Markey, which would (1) bar data brokers from collecting data that brokers
knew were illegally obtained; (2) require brokers to allow consumers to review
personal information gathered about them at least once per year for free; and
(3) empower consumers to dispute the accuracy of data collected, which
brokers would then have to investigate and correct.' The FTC also expanded
upon the existing DATA proposals by recommending legislation that would
require consumers to opt in to the sharing of any sensitive data, such as certain
health data.167 The FTC also recommended that the legislation require brokers
to disclose their data sources and notify consumers when collected data
adversely affected a commercial transaction.' 6 8 In addition, the FTC suggested
that a central website be created to list the largest fifty data brokers and provide
links to their access tools and opt-out policies.' 69
A number of privacy scholars have proposed additional reforms to
regulate broker activity. These range from the advocating for legislation in line
with the EU's Data Privacy directivel 70 to expanding disclosure and correction
requirements. Scholars have called for Congress to enact a law similar to
California's Right to Know Act, which would require companies to reveal,
upon request, the information they have collected about an individual and how
the information is used and sold.1 72
A recent empirical study of consumer reactions to privacy disclosures
registers one critique of these proposals, arguing that they "rely[] on the fiction
that if customers are told about the uses of their information, they will vote
with their feet if they do not like the terms." However, the novel proposals
166. See Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 2025, 113th Cong.
(2014); Schmitz, supra note 12.
167. Id. at 52. For more on sensitive data frameworks as a possible response to the
threat of relational control, see infra Part V.
168. FTC Data Brokers, supra note 4, at 51-52.
169. Schmitz, supra note 12, at 1458.
170. See, e.g., Kuempel, supra note 12; Maeve Z. Miller, Note, Why Europe Is Safe
from Choicepoint: Preventing Commercialized Identity Theft Through Strong Data Protection and
Privacy Laws, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 395 (2007). While these and other scholars have called for
a more European approach to digital privacy in the commercial realm, this Note takes the view that these
calls are unlikely to succeed, given the relative inelasticity of U.S. privacy law in the face of
dramatically increased concern over data privacy. See Jay P. Kesan et al., A Comprehensive Empirical
Study of Data Privacy, Trust, and Consumer Autonomy, 91 IND. L.J. 267,347 (2016).
171. See Lipman, supra note 12, at 786-96.
172. See, e.g., Jugpreet Mann, Note, Small Steps for Congress, Huge Steps for Online
Privacy, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 365, 387 (2015).
173. P. Kesan et al., A Comprehensive Empirical Study of Data Privacy, Trust, and
Consumer Autonomy, 91 IND. L.J. 267,347 (2016).
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offered by the authors-including the creation of Profile Information Reporting
Agencies, which, like credit reporting agencies, would store consumers' data
profiles and allow consumers to challenge and correct inaccurate information-
also would not protect consumers from the threat of relational control. 174
B. Reforms for Information Services
In addition to the proposals to regulate the data broker industry, scholars
have recommended a number of interventions that would require information
services and data holding companies to protect consumer privacy. As FTC
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez noted, these proposals are usually familiar.1 75 Calo
and others have proposed that companies offer a tracking-free version of their
service that consumers can purchase.176 Many, including members of Congress,
have called instead for the creation of universal "opt-out" provisions for
consumers to refuse online tracking.1 77 Similarly, many scholars have proposed
reforms to the increasingly dated statutory privacy protections described in Part
II.178
Scholars also typically line up behind (or critique) various "good data
practices" frameworks, such as the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)
framework.1 79 The FTC articulated its Privacy By Design (PBD) principles in
2012, which call on companies to delete consumer data that are no longer
needed and to allow consumers to access their data and, when appropriate, to
change or delete information that companies possess. so These principles are
neither wholly novelist nor without criticism, including ideological
174. See id. at 346-49.
175. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, The Privacy Challenges of Big Data: A View
from the Lifeguard's Chair 1 (Aug. 19, 2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public-statements/privacy-challenges-big-data-view-
lifeguard%E2%80%99s-chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf ("The emergence of big data is similarly
breathtaking and potentially game changing. But the challenges it poses to consumer privacy are
familiar . . . . The solutions are also familiar.").
176. See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 95 (2014).
177. See Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th Cong. (2011); Do-Not-Track
Online Act of 2011, S.913, 112th Cong. (2011); Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th
Cong. (2011); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 (1999).
178. Eugene E. Hutchinson, Note, Keeping Your Personal Information Personal:
Trouble for the Modern Consumer, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1151 (2015); Mann, supra note 172, at 37; See
Ohm, supra note 16, at 1191; see also Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and
"Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003); Orin S. Kerr, Norms of
Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2016).
179. Borgesius et al., supra note 29, at 2101-06 (describing various Fair Information
Principles and how they came to be articulated).
180. Id. at 23-24.
181. See Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, Big Data, Privacy and the Familiar
Solutions, 11 J.L. EcON. & POL'Y 1, 1-2 (2015) (describing the PBD framework as "essentially a
restatement of the traditional Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) of Notice, Choice, Access and
Security," which in turn embody "all of the concepts" in the 1980 privacy guidelines promulgated by the
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disagreement over the scope of consumer protection regulationsl82 and the
never-ending struggle to keep frameworks up-to-date with the rapid expansion
of data and how they are used.' 83
Regulatory FIPP or PBD frameworks are similarly incapable of protecting
consumers from relational control. These frameworks, along with coherent
cyber security norms,184 can provide useful best practices for how companies
should de-identify and secure data, as well as delete data over time. However,
they do not address the basic structural feature of the commercial data
environment that allows many private actors to collect records of user activity
and sell them to interested purchasers.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Congress will amend federal privacy
statutes either to prevent the trading of the digital information that relates to
regulated sectors' 85 or to establish general privacy rules for consumer
information (as some have recommended).186 Federal statutory privacy law has
remained unchanged despite the rampant purchase and sale of data, a near
constant stream of embarrassing data breaches and leaks, and an increasingly
lengthy list of documented privacy harms.187 With one narrow exception,
Congress has not passed a statute expanding federal privacy protections in
more than a decade.189 Federal statutory reforms are also often poorly designed
to combat future privacy threats. New Congressional enactments would face
familiar undertows in the form of swift obsolescence, dilution by industry
lobbying, or the well-documented tendency to target specific technologies.190
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)); see also Borgesius et al., supra
note 29, at 2101-06 (describing the scope of the OECD guidelines).
182. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Regulation of Information and Advertising, 4
COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 169, 169-92 (2008) (arguing that the FTC has at times overprotected
consumers with excessive regulation that curbs innovation).
183. See, e.g., Lenard & Rubin, supra note 181, at 26 (arguing that the
commissioner's recommendation are "ill suited to the world of big data"); Omer Tene, Privacy Law's
Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
1217 (2013).
184. Cybersecurity Framework, NAT'L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf.
185. If Congress did reform existing statutes, other records of digital activity, such as
what consumers read and watch, would not be affected.
186. See, e.g., Kuempel, supra note 12, at 207; Miller, supra note 170, at 395.
187. See generally Introduction, supra.
188. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, H.R. 493, 110th Cong.
§ 2 (2008).
189. See Ohm, supra note 16, at 1125 (citing the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act as the only "meaningful expansion of privacy law Congress has enacted in the
last decade").
190. See Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15
YALE J.L. & TECH. 24 (2012) (documenting examples of statutes that prove ineffective or stifling
because they target particular technologies for reform).
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C. Privacy-Enhancing Consumer Technologies
Technologists have developed a number of tools to shield consumers from
digital tracking, such as adblockers or cookie deleting services. However, these
services are unlikely to inoculate a user from the threat of relational control.
There are significant economic incentives for online actors to track consumer
activity,191 which fuel the internet's free pricing structure.192 These incentives
lead to new tracking technologies (such as web beacons), 193 which when first
implemented track consumers without their knowledge, and new services (such
as Pok6mon Go), which often begin with few privacy protections for
consumers. 194 This lag time is an inevitable consequence of a free market
economy, and ensure that technical opt-outs will struggle to provide sustained
protection against relational control.
Additionally, a wide array of tools-from the Tor browser,1 95 to virtual
private networks (VPN),196 end-to-end encrypted messages,197 and encrypted
191. See Alan Henry, Everyone's Trying To Track What You Do on the Web: Here's
How To Stop Them, LIFEHACKER (Feb. 22, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/5887140/everyones-
trying-to-track-what-you-do-on-the-web-heres-how-to-stop-them; Meghan Neal, Now You Can See
Which Websites Are Tracking You in Real-Time, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 25, 2013, 9:35 AM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/now-you-can-see-what-websites-are-tracking-you-in-real-time.
192. See, e.g., Lipman, supra note 12, at 778 ("If you search for something on the
Center for Disease Control's website, say, 'herpes symptoms,' then the CDC will tell Google about your
search. The CDC is not trying to profit from you, but they use Google Analytics to measure their
website traffic. The CDC uses Google Analytics because it is an effective free tool. It is a 'free' tool
because it is quietly paid for with your data." (internal citations omitted)); Emily Steel, Companies
Scramble for Consumer Data, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2013, 8:11 PM); How Many of Your Users Set "Do
Not Track"?, QUANTABLE (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.quantable.com/analytics/how-many-do-not-track/
(measuring the percent of users who opt out of tracking as between 8% and 15%). But see Joseph
Turow, The Tradeoff Fallacy: How Marketers Are Misrepresenting American Consumers and Opening
Them Up to Exploitation, U. PENN (June, 2015),
http://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf.
193. Joanna Geary, Tracking the Trackers: What Are Cookies? An Introduction to
Web Tracking, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2012) (describing flash cookies and web beacons).
194. See, e.g., Brian Barret, Update Your Pokimon Go App Now To Fix That Privacy
Mess, WIRED (July 12, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/07/update-pokemon-go-app-now-fix-
privacy-mess ("That means it could have potentially been able to 'see and modify nearly all information
in your Google Account,' according to Google, short of changing your password or tapping into Google
Wallet. This is very bad! And now you can fix it.").
195. See, e.g., Kavita Iyer, Best Free Tools for Anonymous Browsing 2016,
TECHWORM (May 21, 2016), http://www.techworm.net/2016/05/top-free-tools-2016-anonymous-
browsing.html.
196. See, e.g., Adi Robertson, A VPN Can Stop Internet Companies from Selling Your
Data-But It's Not a Magic Bullet, THEVERGE (Mar. 30, 2017),
http://www.theverge.com/2017/3/25/15056290/vpn-isp-intemet-privacy-security-fcc-repeal ("The right
VPN can protect against lots of things, including government surveillance and malware. But the tool
isn't a magic privacy bullet-in fact, experts can't even agree on a great VPN service, beyond one you
make yourself. While a huge number of companies provide VPNs, many have potential security flaws or
could put your data at risk. It's also difficult to tell how secure a VPN actually is, and what it's doing
with your data. So what are you supposed to do if you want to use one? The short answer is to avoid free
services, and if you consider yourself tech-savvy, look into setting up your own. Otherwise, make sure a




A New Privacy Harm
desktopsi -allow consumers to avoid tracking by most companies and some
security agencies. Most websites run considerably slower on the Tor browser,
and some features, including most video streaming options, cannot work
without risking consumer privacy.1 99  While certain, high information
consumers could limit their vulnerability from relational control, most
consumers will not take the steps necessary to shroud their activity.200 (And, if
they did, their actions could significantly disrupt the information economy.)201
V. "Information Fiduciaries" and "Sensitive Data": Promises and Limits
While most proposed reforms would offer minimal protection against
relational privacy harms, two scholars-Paul Ohm and Jack Balkin-recently
proposed new frameworks that could better protect consumers. This Part lays
out both proposals and describes how each could be amended or extended to
enhance consumer protection against the threat of relational control.
A. Two Approaches to Consumer Protection
Ohm and Balkin tackle data abuses from two distinct fronts, each of
which is relevant to the problem of relational control. Ohm's proposal is data-
centric, highlighting particular types of information-such as social security
numbers or medical information-that can harm consumers and, thus, are
recognized as "sensitive." Legal safeguards exist for certain types of
"sensitive" information, which limit how commercial entities may use these
202data. Ohm advocates expanding U.S. law's conception of sensitive data to
include three new types of information: precise geolocation data, remote
biometric data, and communications metadata.203
197. See, e.g., Craig Timberg, Newest Androids Will Join iPhones in Offering Default
Encryption, Blocking Police, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/09/1 8/newest-androids-will-join-iphones-in-offering-default-encryption-blocking-
police.
198. See, e.g., Privacy for Anyone Anywhere, TAILS (last visited Feb. 18, 2017),
http://tails.boum.org/ (providing a free encrypted operating system that users can load onto computers
and storage devices).
199. See NoScript (last visited Apr. 1, 2017), http://noscript.net/ (providing a Firefox
extension that blocks scripts from loading on untrusted websites).
200. See Kesan, supra note 170.
201. See, e.g., John E. Dunn, Best 7 Online Privacy Tools 2016 - VPNs, Anonymous
Search, and Browser Secrecy, TECHWORLD, (last visited Apr. 1, 2017),
http://www.techworld.com/security/best-7-online-privacy-tools-2016-vpns-anonymous-search-browser-
secrecy-3633529/ ("If it was only advertisers, privacy would be challenging enough but almost every
popular free service, including search engines, social media, cloud storage and webmail, now gathers
intrusive amounts of personal data as a fundamental part of its business model.").
202. Regulatory interventions that protect sensitive information include the HHS's
HIPAA anonymization rules and the FTC's COPPA rule, which enumerates in its definition of sensitive
information a user's first and last name, address (including street name and name of city or town and
telephone number). See 45 C.F.R. pt. 164.514(b)-(c) (2002); 16 C.F.R. pt. 312 (2014).
203. See Ohm, supra note 16, at 1143-44.
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Balkin's proposal, on the other hand, is entity-centric, and offers a new set
of limits on what certain data controllers may do with the consumer data
entrusted to them. Entities like commercial ISPs and popular applications
control vast quantities of information that they have, at times, used to harm or
manipulate consumers.204 Balkin argues that these commercial entities should
be understood as "information fiduciaries" that owe duties to their consumers.
The duties that Balkin sketches would prevent these entities from using data in
ways that directly harmed the consumers that entrusted their data to them.
As presently constituted, neither approach offers meaningful protection
against relational control. Ohm's conception of sensitive data is too narrow and
overlooks myriad information that could be used to manipulate consumers.
Balkin's conception of harmful activity misses the possibility that the sale of
information can pose an indirect threat of consumer harm. Nevertheless, each
proposal provides a coherent framework that could better protect consumers
from relational control.
B. Sensitive Data and Relational Control: Novel Protections and Conceptual
Gaps
Ohm describes sensitive information as a "showstopper"205 that can
summon robust protections out of otherwise lax privacy regulations, if data are
sufficiently sensitive.206 For example, concern for sensitive data is observable
in the FTC's recommendation that data brokers establish opt-out provisions for
207
most data, but opt-in protections for particular, sensitive data. A sensitive
data approach to consumer privacy is particularly appealing in light of the few
limits that U.S. privacy law places on the sale of digital information. A key
feature of the "sensitive information" movement is that it frequently spurs
statutory and regulatory action,208 while also being fueled by private
209industry. Trade groups, like the Network Advertising Initiative and the
Digital Advertising Alliance, and major companies offer their own (often
divergent)210 guidelines on what information is sensitive and, unlike normal
data, cannot be sold for profit.211 Noting these features, Ohm observes that, for
204. See, e.g., supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
205. Ohm, supra note 16, at 1129.
206. Id.
207. FTC Data Brokers, supra note 4, at 54.
208. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
209. Ohm, supra note 16, at 1138 ("[Private industry actors] are probably motivated to
draw these lines by a combination of moral compunction, ethical norms, market demand, and fear of
consumer backlash or government regulation.").
210. See, e.g., id. at 1138-40; Jim Brock, Yet Another (Better) Definition of Sensitive
Boundaries for Ad Targeting, PRIVACYCHOICE (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://blog.privacychoice.org/2011/12/14/yet-another-better-definition-of-sensitive-boundaries-for-ad-
targeting (arguing that the various different industry standards for sensitive boundaries should coalesce
along the lines of Google's definition).
211. See Ohm, supra note 16, at 1138-40.
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privacy advocates, sensitive data "may be the only game in town"2 12 that can
secure protections where so many other proposals have failed.
1. Possible Protections Against Relational Control
A number of Ohm's proposals, if implemented, could yield value in the
looming fight against relational control. First, Ohm's three new types of
"sensitive" data-precise geolocation data, remote biometric data (including
213
iris scan and facial recognition), and communications metadata -are
particularly dangerous in the context of relational control. Communications
metadata can offer powerful maps of an individual's social networks and reveal
changes in interactions.214 For example, Facebook communications metadata
can predict with surprising confidence when individuals will begin a romantic
relationship. 2 15
Second, Ohm argues that U.S. law should evolve to categorize certain
types of data as sensitive data "no matter who holds it." 216 A core challenge for
sensitive data as a partial remedy to relational control is that the vast majority
of relevant U.S. law requires only "particular actors in particular sectors" to
have any safeguarding responsibilities for the information.217 As discussed in
Part II, the constant trading of data28 weakens most U.S. sensitive data laws.219
Ohm calls for a significant expansion of U.S. law, arguing that for certain types
of sensitive information, "we should extend privacy protection regardless of the
specific relationship." 220
Third, Ohm argues that U.S. laws should recognize sensitive data even
when in unstructured forms. Unlike structured data that contain only one type
of information, like an email address, unstructured data exist "at the whim of
the person doing data entry-'comments' or 'notes."' 221 For example, Google
maintains a collection of every search query anyone has entered, which is
perhaps the world's largest database of incidentally collected sensitive
information.222 While technical capacity has traditionally limited one's capacity
212. Id. at 1136.
213. Id. at 1143-44.
214. Leskovec, supra note 116.
215. See Robinson Meyer, When You Fall in Love, This Is What Facebook Sees,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/02/when-you-fall-in-
love-this-is-what-facebook-sees/283865.
216. Ohm, supra note 16, at 1190.
217. Id.
218. See Christl & Spiekermann, supra note 118, at 45-50 (surveying major studies of
data transmissions that found that "37 of the 50 most popular websites transferred information about
every click to over 30 third parties, 22 of them even to more than 60 third parties. The website
dictionary.com transmitted data on every page request to 234 external services" (internal references
omitted)).
219. See supra Section II.A.
220. Id. at 1192.
221. Id. at 1192-93.
222. Id. at 1193.
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to retrieve valuable or tailored information from massive, unstructured datasets
like Google's, the rapidly expanding state of computational power, along with
an array of web scraping, natural language processing, and machine learning
tools,223 enable companies to capture and separate sensitive data from vast,
unstructured collections. Google researchers, for example, have used machine-
learning techniques to automatically distinguish flu symptoms from other
search queries analyzed from the "billions of individual searches from 5 years
of Google web search logs." 224 The power of these new tools underscores the
need to consider possible affirmative protection requirements on unstructured
data.
2. Significant Gaps with Respect to Relational Control
If implemented, these three proposals might reduce certain manifestations
of relational control. Nevertheless, Ohm's proposal is not designed with
relational control in mind. As presently constituted, it can provide only
marginal protection against the threat of relational control.
Ohm's proposals do not address many information types that can be used
to exert relational control. Data that provide deep insights into both behavior
and interactions-for example, browser history, calendar data, purchase
records, and social network metadata-are particularly dangerous in the hands
of peers. To protect against or manage the risk of relational control, Ohm's
proposal would need to be significantly expanded to include as sensitive a
much larger body of data. Recognizing these data types as sensitive could
trigger new regulatory requirements, limiting the circumstances in which this
information could be transferred through, among others, the FIPPs of "purpose
specification" and "use limitation," which can reduce the likelihood that
sensitive data will wind up in the hands of data brokers who are in turn free to
sell data to individual consumers that cannot show a valid purpose.225
C. Information Fiduciaries and Relational Control: A Theoretical Path To
Improve Sale and Storage Practices
Like Ohm, Balkin also looks to jumpstart privacy scholarship by arguing
that a fiduciary relationship226 exists between consumers and data holders.
223. See id. at 1194; Liane Colonna, A Taxonomy and Classification of Data Mining,
16 SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 309, 332-34 (2013).
224. Ohm, supra note 16, at 1195 (quoting Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influenza
Epidemics Using Search Engine Query Data, 457 NATURE 1012, 1013 (2009)).
225. Id. at 1138.
226. Other scholars have also proposed some fiduciary obligations for information
services. See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 282 (2015); Jerry Kang et al., Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 812, 831-32 (2012);
Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMMs. ACM 92, 101 (Sept. 1996). See generally Richard
R.W. Brooks, Knowledge in Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW
(Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).
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Balkin argues this relationship, like other fiduciary relationships, can be
regulated227 without violating freedom of contract228 or the First
Amendment. 229
Balkin analogizes information services and service providers230 to doctors
and lawyers, who owe a common-law duty of loyalty and confidentiality to
their clients and patients.231 Balkin proposes that certain duties of loyalty and
care attach to a wide array of entities, "includ[ing] bookstores, search engines,
ISPs, email providers, cloud storage services, providers of physical and
streamed video, and websites and social networks when they deal in our
intellectual data" (information fiduciaries).232 Under Balkin's framework, each
of these entities would owe consumers some degree of fiduciary obligations
when controlling their data.233
As with Ohm's sensitive data proposal, Balkin's information fiduciaries
framework is ill-suited as proposed to protect consumers from relational
control. Balkin's framework is designed to protect consumers from direct ill
treatment by the companies that initially collect their data,234 rather than from
the indirect relational abuses that data transactions enable. Balkin does not
explore whether and how to extend fiduciary obligations to data sale.
Concerned that such obligations would undermine the financial viability of
information services,235 Balkin also disputes, at least to some extent, the idea
227. See Balkin, supra note 19, at 1205 ("The idea of fiduciary duties gives us a way
out of the neo-Lochnerian model that binds First Amendment freedoms to contractual freedom. It also
offers us a way of explaining why certain kinds of information are matters of private concern that
governments can protect through reasonable regulation. My central point is that certain kinds of
information constitute matters of private concern not because of their content, but because of the social
relationships that produce them.").
228. A major dilemma raised in privacy scholarship is how to treat a company's
privacy policy, and to what extent the privacy policy should be understood as a contract that binds both
consumers to (often-unconsidered) agreements and companies to prior promises of privacy. See, e.g., M.
Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027
(2012); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880
(2013); Sovern, supra note 177.
229. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 114, at 1051 (arguing that many privacy laws
regulating the sale and disclosure of personal information are unconstitutional under existing First
Amendment law).
230. Compare Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738,
19,741 (Apr. 13, 2015) (defining a broadband internet access service) with Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 3(a)(2), 110 Stat. 56, 58-60 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(24))
(defining an information service).
231. Balkin, supra note 19, at 1205.
232. Id. at 1221 (quoting NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 282 (2015)).
233. Balkin does not specify the exact scope of these obligations, which may also
differ depending on the information fiduciary's commercial activities. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 19, at
1228.
234. See, e.g., id. at 1187-94 (describing a recent Facebook study aimed at
manipulating the voting preferences of its users).
235. See id. at 1227 ("It cannot be the case that the basic business model of free or
subsidized online services inherently violates fiduciary obligations and therefore can be made illegal.
'Fiduciary' does not mean 'not for profit."').
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that fiduciary obligations should trigger liability for possible, indirect harms to
end-users.2 3 6
Nonetheless, Balkin's framework can be extended to combat the threat of
relational control without threatening the basic viability of a free services
model. The responsibilities of information fiduciaries could be expanded to
limit what data companies can sell to brokers and, in particular, the terms of
these agreements. The 2014 FTC report notes that some data sellers demand
consumer protections in their contracts with brokers.237 Contractual provisions,
if consistently applied across most information services and service providers,
could protect consumers to a significant degree from the possibility of
relational control. Unlike many other harms associated with data broker
practices,238 relational control becomes a possibility when data brokers sell
consumer information to individuals. Accordingly, restrictions on subsequent
sales, re-identifying anonymized data, and the use of data beyond a specified
set of purposes could meaningfully limit the ability of interested consumers to
purchase data.
While Balkin does not discuss how or if fiduciary obligations might
extend to data sales, his fiduciaries framework could credibly be extended to
obligate companies to store data securely, and restrict what third parties and
data brokers may control, sell, and use. A broader construction of fiduciary
obligations that extends to data sale and storage does not stretch Balkin's model
beyond its intended scope, as restrictions on what data can be sold are included
among the fiduciary obligations for doctors and lawyers and, more importantly,
are consistent with the general implicit and explicit assurances that information
fiduciaries make to consumers that they may be trusted with consumer data.239
VI. Doctrinal Recommendations in Light of Relational Control
Protecting consumers from relational control presents a considerable
challenge, given the inflexible state of U.S. privacy law and the legal
challenges posed by both the First Amendment and contract law. Further,
because the threat of relational control both emerges from a wholly legal
activity (data purchase) and is the manifestation of quintessential human
instincts (to learn about one's peers and make choices based on that
information), there is no single answer to this threat that remains consistent
with U.S. law. Part VI offers some initial doctrinal recommendations to protect
consumers from the threat of relational control. As these proposals are the first
to respond to the relational control harm, they are not exhaustive and unlikely
236. See id. ("Nevertheless, if we impose fiduciary obligations that are too broad, it
might follow that online service providers could not make any money at all from this data because the
data might be used in some way to some end-user's disadvantage.").
237. See FTC Data Brokers, supra note 4, at 16-17.
238. See supra Introduction.
239. See Balkin, supra note 19, at 1203-05.
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to offer a comprehensive solution. This Note invites follow-up proposals and
remedies in the years ahead.
A. Congressional Privacy Reforms
Congress should pass legislation that unambiguously protects consumers
from a significant relational control threat: the content and meta-data of
electronic communications. The SCA prohibits providers of electronic
communications services (ECS) from divulging the contents of
communications to private parties while those communications are "in
electronic storage."240 It also prohibits providers of a remote communications
service (RCS) from divulging the contents of communications "carried or
maintained on that service." 241 However, these prohibitions contain significant
gaps. The SCA allows entities that qualify as neither ECS nor RCS to disclose
communications to third parties,242 as well as ECS providers to disclose the
content of communications that are not in electronic storage.243 Additionally,
the SCA offers no protections for the metadata associated with the content of
communications.244
Congress should close these gaps by passing legislation that prohibits any
person or entity from disclosing, without consent, to non-governmental persons
and entities the content and metadata of other forms of electronic
communication. Already, there is political interest in some of these reforms. In
2016, the House of Representatives passed the Email Privacy Act, 419-0.245
The House Bill amends 18 U.S.C. § 2702 to bar (1) an ECS from selling to
third parties the content of any communication "that is in electronic storage
with or otherwise stored, held, or maintained by that service," and (2) an RCS
from selling to third parties the content of any communication communications
"that is stored, held, or maintained by that service."246 This language expands
the scope of the SCA to protect the content of all wire and electronic
communications that are controlled by an ECS or RCS.
240. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2012).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2) (2012).
242. See Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1997) ("Thus, a person
who does not provide an electronic communication service (like Ferguson and Hudson) can disclose or
use with impunity the contents of an electronic communication unlawfully obtained from electronic
storage.").
243. See Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 2012) (holding that emails
"were not in electronic storage" after plaintiff "left the single copies of his e-mails on the Yahoo! server
and apparently did not download them or save another copy of them in any other location").
244. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2012) (prohibiting an ECS or RCS from "knowingly
divulgling] a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber ... to any government entity").
245. H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2016), http://www.congress.gov/bill/1l4th-
congress/house-bill/699/text; Dustin Volz, Email Privacy Bill Unanimously Passes U.S. House,
REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2016, 4:56 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-email-
idUSKCNOXOI J7.
246. H.R. 699,114th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2016).
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The Email Privacy Act does not currently impose any restrictions on any
person or entity that does not qualify as an ECS or RCS but nonetheless might
somehow acquire electronic communications. The Email Privacy Act also does
not address the sale of metadata-which can provide clear maps of social
relationships and how they evolve over time. When the Senate next considers
the Email Privacy Act, it should (1) amend the proposed legislation to move
away from an entity-centric regulatory model with respect to the sale of
communications, and (2) adopt new protections against the commercial sale of
metadata. Such an amended Email Privacy Act would provide meaningful
protection against the abuse of a particularly dangerous type of data. The law
would also reflect both Congress's longstanding preference for narrow privacy
reforms and longstanding U.S. commitment to the privacy of written
-247
expression.
Congress could make an array of changes to existing federal statutes and,
as a result, meaningfully limit (but not eliminate) the threat of relational
control.248 However these changes are unlikely, due to the fact that data sale
has become such an important part of the internet economy, the difficulty
inherent in mounting a major lobbying campaign,249 and that Congress is likely
to prioritize privacy reforms in the national security space in the near term over
those in the commercial sphere.250 Additionally, while updating existing
privacy rules in laws such as HIPAA and FERPA would likely prove
beneficial, it could also have unintended negative effects on the economy,
removing a significant income stream from free applications and sites that
collect data related to one's health or education. 251
B. Privacy Torts Reconsidered
Common law courts could also provide an ex post remedy for victims of
relational control and related privacy harms by extending existing privacy and
negligence torts to reflect contemporary technological sensibilities.
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (2012) ("Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package
[of another] . . . or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
248. See generally supra Parts II & IV.
249. See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 16, at 1140.
250. See, e.g., Richard A. Hertling & Kaitlyn McClure, In Congress: Trade, Privacy,
Fiscal Year 2017, LAw360 (Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/788308/in-congress-trade-
privacy-fiscal-year-2017; Republican/Conservative Bills Supported and Opposed, MAPLIGHT (Jan. 25,
2017), http://maplight.org/us-congress/interest/Ji 100/bills.
251. See, e.g., Thorin Klosowksi, Lots of Health Apps Sell Your Data. Here's Why,
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1. Peer Data Purchase as Privacy Intrusion
The Second Restatement of Torts defines the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion as follows: "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would
be higly (?f252be highly offensive to a reasonable person." The Restatement's Comments
clarify that the intrusion may involve some form of investigation or
examination into a person's private concerns, "as by opening his private and
personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank
account, or compelling him by forged court order to permit an inspection of his
personal documents." 253 Thus, it is possible that courts could view the purchase
of a peer's sensitive data-such as their emails or GPS data-as an
investigation that intrudes on their seclusion.
Courts to date have held that the sort of incursions upon privacy that result
from data sale fall well short of the "highly offensive" standard.254 Relational
control poses two new dilemmas for common law courts to consider in the
years ahead. First, as a preliminary matter, whether a plaintiff can claim a
privacy interest in the data that are legally controlled by a third party. Second,
whether an acquaintance's purchase of the plaintiffs data is highly offensive to
a reasonable person.
It is a structural feature of the digital age that one's personal data, over
which it was once possible to exercise sole control, are now inevitably
possessed by some third parties.255 Whatever one does online will be recorded
by many entities-among them the commercial ISPs, third party advertisers,
host websites (as well as perhaps an array of state intelligence agencies).
Internet users should not lose their privacy interests in their most intimate data
simply because the structure of the internet does not allow them to operate
online without some actors gaining control over the records of their online
activity.256 This view is supported by Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in U.S.
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (Am. Law Inst. 1977) (emphasis
added).
253. Id. cmt b.
254. See supra Section I.B.
255. Cf. Robert S. Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Information Age, 126 YALE
L.J.F. 8, 15 (Apr. 27, 2016) ("To this extent, I agree with those who criticize the broad proposition that
any information that is disclosed to third parties is outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Courts can appropriately take into account whether information is content or non-content information,
whether it is publicly disclosed through social media or is stored in the equivalent of the cloud, or
whether its exposure is 'voluntary' only in the most technical sense because of the demands of modern
technology." (emphasis in original))
256. See Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-
Snowden Era, PEW (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions
("91% of adults in the survey 'agree' or 'strongly agree' that consumers have lost control over how
personal information is collected and used by companies."). Even the technologies that allow
"anonymous browsing" should probably not be viewed as reliably private, as intelligence and both
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v. Jones, which pushed back on the idea that third party possession of data
invalidates an expectation of privacy from other third parties.257 As a threshold
issue to determine whether certain instances of relational control may constitute
a tortious invasion of privacy, courts should recognize a continued privacy
interest in private information that necessarily must exist in the hands of certain
third parties.
In order to recognize an intrusion tort for certain instances of relational
control, courts would need to find that the intruder's purchase of data was
"highly offensive." Some courts have interpreted the "highly offensive"
standard as an unreasonably high bar to recognizing intrusion case. For
example, some courts have held that an individual's unauthorized access of
another's email failed to meet the standard for "highly offensive" behavior,258
an interpretation that seems unreasonable given that the Second Restatement's
comment includes the opening of mail as an example of intrusion. Similarly, it
would seem that a consumer's purchase of another's GPS data or bank
transactions could constitute an intrusion upon that person's seclusion.
A legal prohibition that target's the purchaser's behavior nevertheless also
invites pitfalls. An overbroad interpretation of "highly offensive" could
undermine the value of consumer data that is sold to commercial entities for
advertising purposes. Similarly, an expanded intrusion tort could chill digital
consumers' acquisition of consumer information for non-harmful ends. As
courts consider the specific fact patterns that would trigger liability for
intrusion, courts should understand "highly offensive" in light of evolving
norms of digital activity, while being careful not to invite over enforcement
with too broad a construction.259
government and commercial entities will remain in a tug of war over activity that takes place over these
technologies.
257. See 565 U.S. 400, 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("But whatever the societal
expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason
alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection."). See also id. at 427-29 (Alito, J., concurring)
(observing that privacy expectations are in flux in the new technological environment that allows
wireless carriers to store precise GPS data, and arguing that legislatures are better suited than courts are
to address privacy standards).
258. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 585, 131
Lab. Cas. (CCH) T 58104 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (applying Pennsylvania law, holding that despite assurances
that e-mail communications would not be intercepted, management's confiscation of an employee's
email was not highly offensive because the emails sent included inappropriate and unprofessional
comments); Thompson v. Ross, 2010 WL 3896533 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (applying Pennsylvania state
common law, dismissing plaintiffs claim that his ex-girlfriend had provided his personal computer to
coworkers, who were able to gain, search, and extract old emails from the computer hard drive, because
he failed to show that his employer invaded his privacy).
259. For example, it might be unwise to expand intrusion doctrine such that it covers
behavior like the hypothetical that opened this Note, as it is increasingly common practice to research a
new person before you meet them. Cf. Maureen O'Connor, The New Abstinence: Not Googling Your
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2. Unrestrained Data Sale as Negligent
While an expanded intrusion tort could allow certain victims of relational
control to sue their controller, common law courts could also expand
negligence doctrine to allow suit against the data seller, taking the route of
chopping at supply rather than demand. As noted, courts to date have been
leery to find data brokers negligent in the data sale context.260 However, given
the permanence of data and the breadth of its subsequent uses, courts should
consider whether sales of highly sensitive data (in type or scope)-particularly
with no contractual restrictions on subsequent use or sale-place consumers at
unreasonable risk.
C. Balkin and Ohm Frameworks as Ex Post Protections
As discussed in Part V, Balkin and Ohm each advance proposals that
could protect consumers from this new avenue for digital abuse, while still
accommodating a digital environment that places highly sensitive information
in the hands of a diverse array of commercial entities.
Ohm's proposal should be expanded in federal and state regulations to
construe a far wider category of information as sensitive. U.S. laws governing
sensitive data should recognize not only communications metadata, but also
new data types-including calendar data, browsing history, social network
data, purchase records, and other information that could provide insights into a
person's personality and habits. Expanding the data types that U.S. law
recognizes as sensitive would trigger various regulatory protections-including
the FIPPs of "purpose specification" and "use limitation"-for data that could
211be particularly harmful in the context of relational control.
This recommendation could prove costly, as expanding the types of data
that regulators consider sensitive would likely increase the proportion of
companies that need to submit to burdensome regulatory safeguards. Over-
protective regulations could also curb the development of many important, pro-
societal benefits that stem from the efficient commercial access to consumer
data. 262
Balkin's conception of information fiduciaries should be construed to
require companies to limit the risk of privacy harms that stem from secondary
use. The framework should support regulations that could, for example, require
companies to encrypt data while in storage and allow data sale only in the
context of contractual rules that forbid re-identification and subsequent,
260. See supra Section II.B.
261. Ohm, supra note 16, at 1138.
262. This Note has not extensively explored the benefits of our current data broker
regime. See, e.g., Ohlhausen & Okuliar, supra note 16, at 121-24 (describing a broad array of consumer
and societal benefits advanced by data availability in the United States). These benefits require careful
weighing of the regulatory intervention.
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purpose-flexible resale. Such duties would limit brokers' access to consumer
data, but also likely impose transactional costs. 263
D. Privacy Opt-ins for Data Sale
Privacy policies remain a particularly fertile ground for privacy reform.
The FTC's Section 5 enforcement actions take aim at companies that lack
privacy policies and at those whose behavior deviates from their stated
policies.264 As Solove and others have noted, opt-outs are common provisions
in privacy policies, often requiring a consumer to check a box, call, or mail the
company within a certain time period to confirm their choice.265 However, opt-
outs also come with risks, including a consumer's implied, unwitting consent to
266policies that may prove detrimental. In order to avoid setting consumers up
for bad "deals," the FTC should explore requiring companies to include a
narrow set of clear, logistically smooth opt-in provisions regarding the sale of
collected data. Requiring that companies receive from consumer consent that
was not tied to a reduction or denial of service would provide a strong
mechanism for consumers to protect themselves against the threat of relational
control.
These proposed changes to privacy doctrine will not inoculate consumers
from the threat of relational control, nor are they immune to criticism.
However, in tandem or in isolation, these proposed shifts to U.S. privacy law
will help manage a problem, which, unconstrained, may only grow in extent
and intensity.
Conclusion
Under the current legal regime, a person's intimate information can be
acquired by someone in his or her social or professional circles for the purpose
of exercising control. This threat is growing and adds to the imperative that
digital privacy be properly protected. Although a decisive solution to this
problem may prove elusive, there are a handful of doctrinal reforms that, if
implemented, will significantly reduce consumer exposure to relational control.
The relational control problem also underscores the oft-overlooked
contextual features of digital privacy. As society has moved from the analog to
the digital age, individuals have lost the ability to exercise sole control over
their private information. The records of digital activity are controlled by many
263. See also Sebastian Zimmeck, The Information Privacy Law of Web Applications
and Cloud Computing, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 451 (2013).
264. See, e.g., Solove & Hartzog, supra note 102, at 598.
265. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTS, INFORMATION PRIVACY
LAW 828-35 (5th ed., 2015); Sovem, supra note 177.
266. Solove, supra note 16 (critiquing "privacy self-management" as failing to
provide people with meaningful control over their data).
706
Vol. 34, 2017
A New Privacy Harm
actors, from private ISPs to state intelligence services, which exist beyond a
consumer's ability to meaningfully influence them.
Privacy violations that lead to relational control are inherently context
dependent. The data that might be harmless in the hands of an entity like
Facebook or a federal agency can be dangerous if possessed by a professional
or social rival. Any legal intervention that aims to protect consumers from
relational control must recognize this contextual feature of privacy-that what
is important is not only what others may know but also who may know it.
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